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ABSTRACT 
This manuscript examines the evolution of internet value systems in the motion control industry. We 
believe the primary reason behind the inconsistent performance of that industry's adoption of the internet 
in the supply channel was largely due to poor strategy. Using a the concepts of bias exchanges and game 
theory it is suggested that intemet strategies such as disintermediation and first-mover advantage were 
elusive because firms focused too much on technology and not enough on customer value. Lessons for 
managers and future decisions are offered. 
INTRODUCTION 
Business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce holds the promise of efficiently managing procurement activities and 
opening up new markets (Sood et. ah, 1999). Thousands of B2B initiatives have been developed over the past 
decade targeting different vertical and horizontal market segments, providing tools to expand the reach of 
participants, and reducing procurement costs. For many firms, these activities seem to be largely based on reactions 
to the marketplace rather than the result of a larger overall strategy. Industrial suppliers such as Rockwell, W. W. 
Grainger, and Siemens funded venmres aimed at different industrial channels in order to capture a greater share of 
the market through web-based technology. Despite significant investments in technology the result of these activities 
led to only minor revisions of the distribution and value systems (Gilbert & Bacheldor, 2000). The lack of a 
fundamental change in the industrial products market mirrors the reality that many B2B intemet initiatives were not 
as successful as predicted. 
A few B2B initiatives in this market have been successful but competition, government regulation, security 
concems, and a downtum in the economy may have contributed to the downfall and repositioning of many of these 
efforts. We believe the primary reason behind the inconsistent performance of the industrial market adoption of the 
intemet in the supply channel was largely due to poor strategy. The emergence of the intemet as a tool in the value 
system altered many successful firms' strategies. The changes in strategy were a result of a shift in thinking away 
from providing the customer value towards attempting to exploit technology. The purpose of this paper is to 
evaluate the progress of ecommerce in the industrial market, highlighting the models that companies are using and 
lessons that can be leamed from some of the recent B2B initiatives. Because of the size and ubiquity of the industrial 
market, many of the findings presented here can be generalized to other value systems. 
Background on the Industrial Market for Motion Control 
A key product segment within the industrial market is motors and controls used for a variety of processes. These 
products tend to be specialized, offered in a variety of configurations, and are often purchased through pre-
negotiated contracts. The global demand for motors, drives, and motion control is estimated at approximately $125 
billion (U.S.).^ Estimates place the number of manufacturers involved in this market at approximately 5000, and the 
number of sales channels selling these products at close to 150,000. Manufacturers include global corporations like 
Siemens, Rockwell, and Mitsubishi, to smaller, local manufacturers like AC Technologies, KB Electronics, and 
' Per Motion Tech Trends, Inglewood, California 
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Groschopp. Sales channels range from $5 billion firms like W.W. Grainger, and Graybar Electric to smaller 
distributors with less than ten employees and sales of under one million dollars per year. ^ Larger channel member 
offer a broad range and deep assortment of industrial supplies, while smaller channel members may focus on the 
sales and service of a specific range of devices, such as electric motors and controls, or on a specific industry such 
automotive ore aerospace. 
B2B Marketspaces 
Numerous authors have offered a variety of definitions of B2B marketspaces and exchanges. This paper uses Sood 
(et. al.'s, 1999) definition of a B2B marketplace as having two components: (1) effastructure, the essential 
architecture of B2B marketspace, and (2) e-markets. Ho and Chen (2000) added that an efrastructure includes 
"auction solutions sofiware, content management software, and Web-based commerce enablers while e-markets are 
Web sites where buyers and sellers come together to communicate, exchange ideas, advertise, bid in auctions, 
conduct transactions, and coordinate inventory and fulfillment." Kaplan and Sawhney (2000) identified specific 
characteristics of two alternative market-making mechanisms: aggregation and exchanges (see Table 1). In this 
context, aggregation consolidates supply and demand in a simple marketspace while exchanges match buyers and 
sellers. Many sites in the industrial market for motion control (IMMC) supply chain have attempted to serve as both 
an aggregator of supply and an enabler of supply chain procurement. Kaplan and Sawhney's (1999) concept of bias 
dictates that a biased, or one sided marketspace, favors either the buyers or the sellers by helping them to "negotiate 
better terms or streamline the buying/selling process" (Sweeney, et. al. 1999). An aggregator is an example of seller 
bias and a reverse auction would be an example buyer biased. 
\ g ! : r eg : i t i i i i i  Mcc lu in i sms  Mi i rk  
be s t  «hen :  
• Products are specialized, not • 
commodities. 
• The cost of processing a • 
purchase order is high relative to 
the cost of items procured. 
• Purchasing is done through pre- • 
negotiated contracts. 
• The number of individual • 
products, or stock-keeping imits 
(SKUs), is extremely large. 
• The supplier universe is highly • 
fragmented. 
• Buyers are not sophisticated • 
enough to understand dynamic 
pricing mechanisms. 
• A metacatalog of products • 
carried by a large number of 
suppliers can be created. 
l Acha i i ge s  work  l i e s i  when :  
Products are commodities or near-
commodities and can be traded sight 
unseen. 
Trading volumes are massive relative 
to transaction costs. 
Buyers and sellers are sophisticated 
enough to deal with dynamic pricing. 
Companies use spot purchasing to 
smooth the peaks and valleys of supply 
and demand. 
Logistics and fulfillment can be 
conducted by third parties, often 
without revealing the identity of the 
buyer or seller. 
Demand and prices are volatile. 
Table 1 Kaplan and Sawhnev's (20001 Market-Making Mechanisms: 
In the IMMC marketspaee, many exchanges offered communities, collaboration tools, classified ads, auctions, 
catalog software and more. The industrial auction sites focused on making a market for the seller selling 
excess/obsolete/ refurbished goods. Classified ads served a similar purpose where surplus/used /refurbished goods 
could post until sold. Online catalogs, like those found at http://www.grainger.com, allowed suppliers to offer an 
even broader range of products than their paper catalog. These online catalogs were integrated with entire 
^ US Census, Trade Associations (National Association of Wholesale Distributors, others) and Motion Tech Trends 
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distribution/inanufacturing/logistics network, ebusiness websites add in software integration solutions aimed at 
streamlining the procurement process, and features like reverse auctions which are used to help buyers lower 
procurement cost of purchasing standardized materials. The reliance on multi-functional websites and technological 
features in the IMMC market mirrors of those many other industrial and consumer markets. 
It was a perception on the part of larger IMMC participants that deployment of multi-functional marketspaces was 
required to capture a competitive advantage. However, as Porter (2001) points out "the internet per se will rarely be 
a competitive advantage." The adaptation of the value systems in the IMMC market was analogous to Levit's (1966) 
and Schnaar's (1994) innovative imitation. The result was no clear or compelling new competitive advantage for any 
firm. The resultant management decisions can be examined by reviewing the key decisions in adaptation of the 
internet to the value systems. 
Manufacturer Led Exchange 
In early 1999, major industrial manufacturers were creating their own exchanges - that would serve as the primary 
point of contact on the web for their supply chain. Rockwell Corporation, parent of Allen Bradley and Reliance 
brands established SourceAlliance.com in 1999 reacting to "to increasing customer demand for the efficiencies and 
access offered by the Intemet." (Press Release, 3/15/00). Rockwell reportedly invested $30 to $50 million and raised 
an additional $25 million from chaimel partners. The manufacturers included some of the industries best-known 
companies, including Leviton, Emerson Electric, Cooper Industries, Cutler-Hammer (Triangle Tech Joumal, April 
2001). Claiming 650 distributor locations, and 85 manufacturers, Dan Davis, CEO of Rockwell indicated that 
Rockwell was "proud to have served as the catalyst in galvanizing the industry behind SourceAlliance.com. We are 
committed to supporting its continued growth and development" (Press Release, 3/15/00). 
SourceAlliance.com strategy was to seek first mover advantage, to become the, dominant exchange site for the 
electrical and automation industry, much like Amazon.com, and eBay have done for B2C and C2C respectively. 
They expected to achieve sales of $50 million by 2000, $250 million by 2001, and $500 million by 2002 
(D2Dnet.com, March 2001). 
In April of 2000, Siemens announced that they too were establishing a market exchange for the electrical and 
automation industries. Dr. Klaus Wucherer, a managing director of Siemens AG atmounced, "The big chance for 
Vertacross is that it will be the first of its kind to be able to open the virtual marketplace vertacross.com to all 
manufacturers and users in the automation and low-voltage switchgear sectors as attractive exhibition platform." 
(Siemens, April 2000). 
By the end of 2000, Rockwell CEO Don Davis noted that "If the industry doesn't want it why should we?" Davis 
told Bloomberg News in December "We're not going to support it by ourselves" and by March 3, of 2001, 
SourceAlliance.com was shut down. The by the end of 2001 Vertacross also armounced that it was shutting down. 
Despite investments that totaled close to $100 million in a span of approximately 24 months two of the worlds 
leading industrial manufacturers had failed to generate the kind of business, or retums that they had hoped. 
The failure of Rockwell and Siemens can be traced to a variety of factors not the least of which was the decision to 
capture an advantage in leveraging the intemet to aggregate the market. As Norman (2004) points out the value 
system often drives financial performance; additionally, large companies, at the time, viewed the emergence of the 
intemet in the value system as a threat (Porter, 2001). Consequently the priority for competitive advantage became 
capturing and controlling the technological value chain analytics (Chen, 2004). The larger participants in the IMMC 
industry attempted to exercise control through what Kaplan and Sawhney (1999) called a biased exchange and 
failed. 
BIASED VERSUS NEUTRAL EXCHANGES 
Kaplan and Sawhney (2000) discussed the concept of neutral versus biased exchanges, noting "neutral e-hubs add 
value by reducing transaction costs (aggregating) and improving matching (providing liquidity). If only one side of 
the market is fragmented, the benefits are greatly reduced for the non-fragmented side. Biased e-hubs, in contrast, 
can succeed as long as one side of the transaction is fragmented." Some biased exehanges, like GE's which serves as 
a front end of their supply chain, benefits GE through the affective use of integrated procurement software and 
processes, and the use of software tools like reverse auctions. 
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Central to the biased exchange is the notion of control. GE manages to improve financial performance by 
maintaining fragmentation on the supply side of the market. GE captures significant financial advantage through the 
commoditization of many of the manufacturing and operating inputs. While information between participants in a 
biased hub is free flowing, the structure of the industry and the basis for competitive advantage remain intact. 
Despite the emergence of the internet, the fundamentals of GE's value system and strategy remained intact - GE's 
advantage remained its size relative to its supply partners (Kwak, 2002). 
For the IMMC market, the biased hub was less successful because no single firm's position was dominant enough to 
exploit the fragmentation of the industry. The decision by Rockwell and Siemens to independently control the 
infrastructure of the supply channel in the IMMC market didn't work because both supply side and demand side 
were too fragmented for a bias and aggregation to emerge. The first mover strategy was unsound because an 
advantage couldn't be captured by either Rockwell or Siemens. Despite the problems faced by these two IMMC 
participants several interesting business models did surface during this time. 
Hybrid IMMC Business Models 
The experiences of the past decade have brought to the forefront many classic examples of what happens in a 
competitive market place under conditions of uncertainty. The first wave of B2B appeared in the early 1990's when 
such exchanges as Industry.net managed to get many manufacturers to pay enormous sums for their online 
marketplace. This was followed by early entrepreneurial and intrepreneurial efforts, which focused on developing 
online catalogs, as well as the development of 'virtual' catalogs from third party publishers. The variety of 
approaches attempted in this industry to exploit the internet demonstrates the difficulty in finding convergence of a 
prevailing standard. 
Virtual Sales Channel. Small, local industrial wholesalers have a difficult time competing for large end users on a 
national or global basis. While these smaller chaimels can offer local support, they typically cannot service all needs 
of large customer. In a virtual sales channel, a sponsored third party aggregates small, independent channels to 
create a large, integrated supply source that links up inventory, and provides a single point of contact for national 
accounts. A representative IMMC is SupplyForce.com, which serves as a B2B exchange allowing small, 
independent industrial wholesalers to compete for business with Grainger, Graybar, and others. By linking up 
databases and transaction processing component a virtual sales chaimel can service national accounts and small 
wholesalers now have a chance to compete nationally, while maintaining their local focus. 
Sales Channel Enabler. When firms want to leverage their existing value system, they can use an eCommerce 
platform to collect and distribute sales and leads. A sales chaimel enabler used by Miller Electrics establishes a 
common e-Commerce platform that both Miller and its existing sales channels use to generate sales via the web. A 
manufacturer of welding equipment. Miller has contracted with a third party e-Commerce application service 
provider to link its website to its channels via the online sales process. A customer visits Miller's website, decides 
they want to buy a product, they enter their zip code, and are then transferred to the third parties e-Commerce site 
that is identified as the local distributors website. This effectively passes the lead from Miller to the local channel 
using the web. Presumably, the channel, customer, and Miller all win as the revenue and profit are shared between 
supplier and channel. Instead of disintermediation occurring. Miller uses the web to strengthen their ties with the 
channel. 
Niche Market Channel. For some manufacturers, their existing sales channels fail to provide 100% coverage of the 
industrial marketplace. ABB in the United States successfully gained market share throughout the I980's and 1990 
is becoming the third largest supplier of AC Drives by revenue after Rockwell and Yaskawa. Their strengths lay in 
the market for commercial air handling and pumping controls. While they had a solid base in the industrial market, 
they had very low penetration of the market for low power drives sold to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). 
After several years of trying to use their existing channels to develop a presence in this market, they decided in 1998 
to launch an e-Commerce initiative called comp-ac.com that was designed to sell their low power AC Drives 
directly to these OEM's. Within days of their announcement, several of their largest chaimels had announced plans 
to cancel their contracts with ABB, shifting their support, and customers to another supplier. Several months later, 
ABB had repositioned the website so that it generated leads for their sales channels rather than direct sales for ABB. 
Ultimately, like many such efforts, the site was shut down, and the focus put into global and/or national websites. 
Milacron Corporation, a leading manufacturer of metalworking, and plastic machinery, took a similar approach and 
developed milapro.com as a catalog site targeting the 117,000 small metal working machine shops that it was unable 
to serve using its existing sales channels (Milacron, 1999). Citing a shift in strategy, and low sales volume, they 
shifted the focus of the site to include more products, and more customers. By mid 2001, they had sold 
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approximately $4,000,000 worth of products through milapro.com over a 2-year period. They also decided to 
position milapro.com to at the head of their B2B supply chain initiative. Like comp-ac.com, Milapro.com was 
ultimately shut down in favour of integration into a procurement system. 
International Marketing. Not all manufacturers are fortunate to have a strong network of sales channels in a given 
market. Some, like SEIE, an industrial manufacturer from Italy have a small industrial systems integration business, 
and a private label partnership with GE's Industrial Drives Division. Gaining access to the U.S. market has been 
challenging. Their solution was to go online. In 1999 they launched elestream.com in Italy, then Spain and the 
United Kingdom, and finally in 2001 in the United States and Canada. They currently claim over 1200 active 
customers in Italy, and close to 2000 in the cotmtries in which they operate. Christopher Bradley, Vice President of 
the U.S. operations claims this initiative is different in that "supported by an extremely solid brick and mortar 
business. SlEl has been successfully manufacturing electrical products for 65 years. So, we don't have to evangelize 
the products. Additionally, the e-commerce venture for SIBI has been extremely successful in Italy, Spain and the 
UK.. We have over 1,200 active customers in Italy alone. The business plan is solid and the market is definitely here. 
We just need to execute." (Elestream.com to Bring New Concept to Electrical Distribution and Automation Market, 
2001) Apparently, execution from the U.S. was a problem. Today, elestream.com informs customers that all offers 
will be handled through their Italian warehouse. 
Catalogware. Industrial Supplier W. W. Grainger was spent in excess of $100 million dollars on upgrading its ERP 
system, and in experimenting with a number of different e-Commerce initiatives. Begirming in 1997, Grainger 
developed a range of websites focused on a variety of opportunities. Orderzone.com was a Grainger led industrial 
procurement effort that was designed to serve as the front-end of a supply chain, allowing customers to order all of 
their industrial and commercial products fi'om a single source. Several maintenance, repair, and operational efforts 
followed designed to provide the specific tools, information, and transaction-processing capabilities needed 
available via the web. Grainger's biggest online success though, was the online version of its famous catalog -
http://www.:grainger.com. With over $300,000,000 in sales in 2001 attributed to this website, it was clear that 
grainger.com was an important point of contact for some of their customers. Today, it is an integrated part of their 
procurement system - equally as viable as counter and telephone sales. 
Another, more entrepreneurial industrial sales charmel, AutomationDirect.com launched its online catalog in 1998 as 
a complement to their traditional catalog. AutomationDirect is barely 10 years old, but it has been successful as a 
catalog sales channel of factory automation and motion control products through the use of aggressive marketing 
tactics, and strong customer support. Their e-Commerce efforts have allowed them to broaden their reach without a 
major investment in printing additional catalogs. By shifting their focus to a web based model, they are able to sell 
products to an expanding range of small and medium sized industrial users, while using the intemet to provide 
additional service, and more access to technical documentation, products, and software. 
Entrepreneurial Exchanges. Entrepreneurial efforts also sprung up in the late 1990's all aiming to position 
themselves as the leading exchange focused on specific features, or market segments. In 2002, a review of a leading 
B2B exchange website located at http://www.netmarketmakers.com found that of the 27 sites identified as 
Industrial Market Exchanges, only 15 were still active (see Table 2). By 2006, only 8 were still active, and 
www.netmarketmakers.com no longer existed. 
Some efforts have worked. Ariba (Formerly called Freemarkets.com) in particular is noted for its reverse auctions, 
which allov/ buyers to reduce their procurement costs for specific materials, and sellers to find new customers. 
Square D, tlie North American division of French industrial manufacturer Schneider Electric was able to generate a 
$1 million order for a specific product as a result of Freemarkets.com reverse auction. In reviewing the highly 
detailed request for quote. Square D decided to develop a new range of control transformers that would exactly meet 
the customers' specifications. Mel Rabovsky, Key Account Manager for Square D noted that "We weren't selling 
them our product, we were selling them theirs." (Freemarkets.com, Online) Rabovsky also noted that paiticipating in 
the reverse auction shortened the cycle time of getting the order. 
Site Name Active in 2002 Cturent Model Active in 2006 
1. Ableauctions.com Yes Auction Yes 
2. Activeassets.com No N/A 
3. assetauction.com No N/A 
4. Assettrade.com No N/A -
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5. Aztecsales.com No N/A -
6. bcee.de Yes Auctions Yes 
7. Bigequip.com No N/A -
8. Bigmachines.com Yes Software services Yes 
9. Capacityweb.com No N/A -
10. Corporatesurplus.com Yes/No Auction/Classifieds No activity 
11. aallc.com Yes Auction No 
12. eSprocket.com No N/A -
13. Freemarkets.com Yes Reverse Auctions Yes 
14. Goindustry.com Yes Auction Yes 
15. Indiaengineering.com Yes Software services No 
16. Industrialvortex.com No N/A -
17. Industrialzones.com No N/A -
18. lndustrydeals.com No N/A -
19. Inventorydepot.com No N/A -
20. Lightingbuyer.com No N/A -
21. Lightseek.com No N/A -
22. Liquidation.com Yes Aggregator Yes 
23. Machineryclassifieds.com No N/A -
24. Locatoronline. com Yes Aggregator Yes 
25. Moreprofit.de.com No N/A -
26. Point2.com Yes Aggregator Yes 
27. Ouick-equip.com No N/A -
Table 2 Entrepreneurial exchanges 
"With the standard bid and wait process, order confirmation can take up to a year. With the FreeMarkets process, 
that time is cut way, way, down." (Freemarkets.com) 
Some efforts have worked. Ariba (Formerly called Freemarkets.com) in particular is noted for its reverse auctions, 
which allow buyers to reduce their procurement costs for specific materials, and sellers to find new customers. 
Square D, the North American division of French industrial manufacturer Schneider Electric was able to generate a 
$1 million order for a specific product as a result ofFreemarkets.com reverse auction. In reviewing the highly 
detailed request for quote. Square D decided to develop a new range of control transformers that would exactly meet 
the customers' specifications. Mel Rabovsky, Key Account Manager for Square D noted that "We weren't selling 
them our product, we were selling them theirs." (Freemarkets.com, Online) Rabovsky also noted that participating in 
the reverse auction shortened the cycle time of getting the order. "With the standard bid and wait process, order 
confirmation can take up to a year. With the FreeMarkets process, that time is eut way, way, down." 
(Freemarkets.com) 
LESSONS LEARNED 
The predominant thinking during the explosion of e-business activities in this industry suggested that fotu" distinct 
opportunities were available: 
1) the internet links companies directly to customers, suppliers, and other interested parties; 
2) the internet lets companies b5q)ass other players in an industry's value chain; 
3) the intemet is a tool for developing and delivering new products and services to new customers; 
4) the intemet will enable certain companies to dominate the electronic chaimel of an entire industry or 
segment, control access to customers, and set business mles (Ghosh, 1998). 
As we have seen in the motion control industry, very few of these observations proved useful. Not only was 
dominant control of the value system impossible, the economic utility of disintermediation and the creation of new 
value systems continue to remain illusive. The current state of business models in this industry lead to a variety of 
observations. 
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Disintermediation. After nearly a decade of talk about disintermediation and the affects of networking on integrated 
supply, the evolution of EDI into eBusiness and other shocks to the role of channels, manufacturers and other 
members of the value system still need to be confident in their relationship. A recent study sponsored by the 
National Association of Wholesale Distributors found that "distributors are uncertain about whether their 
manufacturers will be investing in traditional channels during the next five years (D2Dnet.com online, 2002)." The 
study also found disagreement between manufacturers and channels on the impact exchanges will have on the 
industry. "Fifty-six percent of the manufacturers surveyed expect online exchanges to generate loyal customers by 
2006. Yet, 60 percent of distributors express serious doubts online exchanges will attract customers" (D2Dnet.com). 
The pressure to disintermediate provided for the realization of the importance of many types of channel members. 
Channel members provide a variety of benefits including aggregation, breaking bulk, geographic coverage, and 
brand awareness (Anderson, Day & Rangan, 1997). While disintermediation can reduce the collective cost of 
intermediaries, it can also create value gaps by removing critical value from the distribution channel (Gallaugher, 
2002). 
Strategy formulation. Normally when companies are developing a strategy, they seek outside input into the process 
to point them in a direction, or validate their own intemal analysis. During the later part of the 1990's firms in 
IMMC may have been concerned about losing control over their channels and/or customers, and also, about lower 
margins Freeman (2001). 
Using simple game theory (Figure 2) to help understand why Rockwell and Siemens would both 'partner' and 
compete with one another helps reinforce the competitive nature of this industry. The combination of fear, and 
leadership can lead companies to make, what in hindsight, are costly, and perhaps unwise decisions. Freeman (2001) 
noted that any exchange participant should do a comprehensive risk assessment to fully understand the nature of the 
exchange, and how it will impact their business, including the bid process, links between suppliers, and trademark 
issues. Presumably, any risk assessment Siemens or Rockwell may have done was offset by their projections of how 
successful their exchanges would be. 
The drive for a defensive strategy also caused IMMC members to attempt to generalize B2C internet models by 
adopting destination web sites. Kenny and Marshall (2000) note that even in the B2C marketplace" the dominant 
model for Intemet commerce, the destination Web site, does not suit the needs of those companies or their 
customers.' Indeed the focus on destination web sites as a means of charmel control may also have slowed dovra the 
rate of adoption of the intemet as a viable channel for processing transactions, including the need to integrate web 
enabled, and back office software systems, anti-tmst issues that have emerged as a result of competitors forming 
exchanges, and branding issues which can affect the customers perception of an industrial supplier. Marshall (2001) 
noted that multiple suppliers and buyers mean multiple proprietary and standard software packages - both web 
enabled, and back office, which require a high degree of sophisticated integration, at a considerable expense to reap 
the fiill benefits of a shared, web based platform. 
Laflamme and Biggio (2001) pointed out that exchanges carry the added burden of potentially intense scmtiny by 
the United States Department of Justice, and Federal Trade Commission. As in any joint venture, they note that 
these agencies are concemed about the possibility of exclusionary practices that inhibit competition, and possible 
collusion - especially as it relates to price fixing. On the other hand, Marshall (2001) pointed out that that close 
collaboration is necessary to ensure that value is created. Clearly, exchange participants who are competitors walk a 
fine line between collaboration and collusion. 
Communications of the IIMA 101 2006 Volume 6 Issue 1 
The Evolution Of An Internet Market Exchange Lightfoot & Harris 
Outcome Outcome 
> O 
A = A+Y+ZZ% 
B = -Y% 
A and B split profits 
Outcome Outcome 
A = 0% 
B = 0% 
A = -X% 
B = B+X+Z% 
Does Not 
Develops Site Develops Site 
Company B 
Where A = the amount of additional revenue A will make as a result of the 
exchange; 
B = the amount of additional revenue B will make as a result of the exchange; 
Y = the amount of Revenue A will make at the expense of B; 
X = the amount of revenue B will make at the expense of A; 
Z = the amount of revenue B will make at the expense of other competitors; 
ZZ is the amount of revenue A will make at the expense of other competitors. 
Figure 2: Simple Application of Game Theory to Industrial B2B Exchanges 
Lafiamme (et. ah, 2001) suggested that this could create a problem for exehanges, as companies seek to maintain a 
strong identity within their industries. The paradox is that for an exchange to be successful, it needs to create its own 
identity with buyers and sellers alike. The exchange brand may become the dominant brand in the transaction and 
relationship. To ensure its revenue stream, it will need to reinforce the value it creates, while carefully nurturing its 
relationship with the suppliers that participate in its business. Suppliers on the other hand, will continue to do every 
thing they can to strengthen their brand name. Any perceived loss in value due to participation in an exchange will 
be factored into the retum associated with the exchange. 
Many other potential issues can affect the level of participation by a company in an exchange, including trust, 
security, and equity. For many of these participants, the opportunity is to view the past several years as educational 
ones, during which they either had the opportunity to directly, or indirectly learn some lessons about participating in 
B2B e-Commerce. These lessons include the following: 
• In a competitive market place, alliances and partnerships seldom work the way they are intended to; 
• Associations are excellent at aggregating industry information, lobbying congress, and generating data; 
they are not so great at socializing processes - especially when it has to do with a firm's profits, and 
key differentiators. 
• Believing the hype is expensive; 
• Any software implementation beyond installing a new single license application will inevitable take 
more time, cost more money, and perform below expectations; 
• Freemarkets.com and GE demonstrate that exchanges can work 
Exchanges had the potential to influence the market for industrial products - a fact reinforced by recent data fi'om 
the Institute for Supply Management (ISM). ISM sponsors a quarterly survey published by Forrester Research that 
indicated in their April 2002 report that manufacturers were buying 8.3% of their indirect materials, and 5.7% of 
their direct materials via some form of eCommerce. These figures were down from 9.5% and 6.2% in the prior 
report. The study also indicated that over 70% of the manufacturers surveyed indicated they were purchasing some 
items via the internet, with a similar percent indicating the specific use of an exchange. 20.3% indicated use of 
reverse auctions. (Salimondo, June 7, 2002). 
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While the figures are seemingly headed downwards, somewhat consistent with the recent downturn in the economy, 
and slow recovery, the fact remains that industrial end users are purchasing products online. This suggests that 
industrial manufacturers and sales channels need to continue to explore how to leverage the web to develop new 
opportunities, and strengthen existing relationships. 
Recommendations for Managers and other Decision Makers 
Any company looking to set up or join an online channel, eCommerce website, or exchange needs to evaluate the 
impact such a venture will have on their organization by considering (1) their customers; (2) their core 
competencies; (3) their channels. Failure to do so will inevitably lead to conflict, and/or weaken the organizations 
ability to perform. 
Tie (2001) suggested that companies need to persist at making any technology change work. They need to commit 
tliemselves to making the technological and cultural changes necessary to ultimately achieve success. This would 
include maintaining a positive attitude towards the change, and educating employees and stakeholders so that they 
can leam to embrace it. Tie also noted that if a small firm is required by a customer or supplier to use a specific 
exchange or software package, the small firm has little choice but to comply. 
Summary and Conclusions 
McKibben (2001) pointed out that the market for industrial equipment is characterized by low volume, highly 
customized, machines and devices. Kaplan and Sawhney (2000) suggested that for these types of products, 
aggregation mechanism's work best. Noting the capability of exchanges, McKibben added that while they are 
capable of many things, they cannot replace a discussion between two people with an existing level of trust between 
them. 
While the initial wave of B2B activity is over, many industrial manufacturers are still using the web to create new 
markets, develop new customers, and integrate their supply chains. Some have taken their software, and technical 
expertise, and are now offering it to manufacturers as a solution for integrating their procurement systems with the 
web. Vertacross and SciQuest.com are examples of companies that attempted to establish an online exchange but 
then shifted their focus to becoming a 'solutions provider' of software, and services. 
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